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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND MULTINATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN MALAYSIA
Drew R. Atkins†
Abstract:
The International Committee of the Red Cross published a study in
2005 identifying rules of customary international law applicable to armed conflict and
theoretically binding on all nations. This study found that customary state practice has
come to encompass and in some cases exceed protections contained in the Additional
Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, regardless of their applicability to
a given conflict. These findings may impact the domestic law enforcement practices of
states not parties to Additional Protocol II, which regulates non-international armed
conflict. Furthermore, the study may have indirect effects on military cooperation and
legal reform worldwide. By strengthening the legal criticism of domestic laws not
compliant with international humanitarian law, the study directly challenges non-party
states seeking to obtain unqualified military assistance during internal conflicts.
However, this same effect will lend support to increased observance of international
humanitarian law as intervening states’ militaries apply pressure to realize compliance
with customary international law. This comment identifies these implications by
considering a hypothetical future counter-insurgency in Malaysia in which the United
States offers military assistance to the Malaysian government.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2003 arrest of the Malaysian terrorist Hambali reflects the
increasing worldwide reliance on multinational military and police
operations to combat emerging internal security threats.1 This operation,
targeting one of the masterminds of the Jemaah Islamiyah bombings in Bali
and Jakarta,2 involved law enforcement and intelligence personnel from
several countries rather than a unilateral operation against an isolated
enemy.3 The combination of a continuing threat from transnational
extremist groups in Southeast Asia4 and the increasingly multinational
military response to this threat makes sources of international law governing
†

The author thanks Professor Clark Lombardi, University of Washington School of Law; Major
Sean Watts, United States Army; and the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal Editorial Board.
1
See Tony Emmanuel & Leslie Andres, Hambali for Camp Delta, New Straits Times (Malaysia),
August 17, 2003, at 1; Bilveer Singh, ASEAN, Australia and the Management of the Jemaah Islamiyah
Threat 41 (2003).
2
See SINGH, supra note 1, at 41.
3
See Emmanuel, supra note 1.
4
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CONSULAR INFORMATION SHEET, MALAYSIA
(December 30, 2005), available at http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_960.html (explaining that
the State Department continues to consider both the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist
organizations as active threats for Americans traveling overland in Malaysia).
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the use of force more relevant as a regulatory scheme for the region’s
response.
It is against this backdrop that the International Committee of the Red
Cross (“ICRC”) culminated a ten-year effort to identify rules of customary
international humanitarian law (“IHL”) applicable to armed conflict.5 In
addition to customary rules applicable to the conduct of hostilities between
states, the ICRC study also identifies customary rules of international law
regulating armed conflicts in which a state combats insurgents within its
borders.6 Since IHL governing these internal armed conflicts requires states
to meet minimum standards for the treatment and judicial procedural rights
of detainees,7 changes in the IHL regime can have great implications for the
legality of domestic laws with respect to international law.
Prior to addressing the import of the ICRC study, it is necessary to
understand general principles of IHL and customary law. International
humanitarian law is the body of customary and formal law that regulates the
conduct of hostilities between belligerents8 in order “to mitigate some of the
more horrific aspects of organized violence.”9 Also known as the law of
armed conflict and the law of war,10 IHL governs the use of force during
hostilities11 and establishes protections for civilians.12 It is a distinct body of
law from human rights law, although many of the general principles

5
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
[hereinafter ICRC], CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005). See also Jean-Marie
Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding
and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, March 2005, at 175,
177 (summarizing the study’s findings).
6
See Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 197.
7
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 4-6, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [Commonly known as Additional Protocol II; hereinafter APII].
8
It is important to note that while IHL regulates the conduct of hostilities, it is a distinct body of
law from human rights law. Human rights law does not regulate the conduct of belligerents vis-à-vis each
other, but instead is “intended to protect individuals from the arbitrary or cruel treatment of their
government at all times.” Therefore, while the existence of a conflict triggers the application of IHL,
human rights law requires no such trigger. UNITED STATES ARMY CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS, 2005 LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 30 (2005) [hereinafter LOW HANDBOOK].
9
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS,
ACTORS, AND PROCESSES 501 (2005).
10
LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 2.
11
DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 501 (The law of war refers to “the law governing the conduct of
war once initiated”, or jus in bello, apart from the law governing “when a state may legitimately use armed
force in international affairs”, or jus in bello... International humanitarian law now applies to states,
insurgent groups, and individuals engaged in armed conflict.”).
12
DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 502.
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informing human rights law are also central to IHL.13 The Geneva
Conventions of 194914 are one of the major codifications of IHL. Together
with their 1977 Additional Protocols, they provide a comprehensive body of
law for regulating both international and internal armed conflict.15
Even where the Geneva Conventions do not apply to a conflict,
customary international law nevertheless regulates the conduct of
hostilities.16 Unlike a convention, customary law informally evolves from
the consistent practices of most states and reflects their perception of their
legal obligations.17 While a convention binds a state through the state’s act
of ratification, customary international law binds all states who have not
persistently objected to a rule both during and subsequent to its formation.18
Due to the default applicability of customary law to armed conflict, the
evolution of rules of customary IHL can have broad implications for all
states, regardless of the type or intensity of conflict involved.19
The ICRC has defined customary IHL in a way that may become
problematic for non-party states seeking international military cooperation in
combating internal resistance movements. By arguing that a rule is
customary international law, the ICRC both intrudes on the sovereign sphere
of signatories to international humanitarian law treaties such as the Geneva
Conventions and challenges non-signatories to bring their domestic laws into
compliance with international standards. This conflict with customary
13
Much of IHL is analogous to fundamental principles of human rights law, such as the respect for
the life and dignity of all people. See Silvia Borelli, Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International
Law and Detentions Abroad in the “War on Terror”, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, March 2005, 39, 54.
14
Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention [II] for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention [III] Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
the Geneva Conventions].
15
Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 178.
16
LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 20; Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 177.
17
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1987); DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 32. The ICRC study defines customary international law “a
general practice accepted as law,” where evidence indicates both State practice and a State “belief that such
practice is required, prohibited, or allowed... as a matter of law.” HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra
note 5, at xxxi-xxxii, citing International Court of Justice Statute, Article 38(1)(b).
18
LOW HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 20. See also DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 74
(“…international law permits states to opt out of an emerging customary international law rule by objecting
to the rule as it develops . . . . Moreover, a rule once formed is binding on states that did not object, even if
they did not have the opportunity to object.”).
19
See infra Part II, Section B. See also Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 189 (“Indeed [state] practice has
created a substantial numbers of customary rules that are more detailed than the often rudimentary
provisions in Additional Protocol II and has thus filled important gaps in the regulation of internal
conflicts.”).
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international law may simultaneously impair a state’s ability to obtain
military assistance for internal conflicts, and may strengthen the IHL regime
as intervening states apply pressure for legal reform as a condition of
providing assistance.20
The ICRC’s findings are of great importance to international law
because of the unique role of the ICRC as a respected and preeminent
authority on IHL. The ICRC is a critical player in the maintenance of the
IHL regime, having a broad international mandate to develop, interpret, and
enforce IHL through the Geneva Conventions.21 The study’s findings thus
warrant careful international consideration during any armed conflict.
To demonstrate the effects of the study, this comment will identify the
inconsistencies between the ICRC’s identified customary rules and
Malaysia’s widely criticized Internal Security Act (“ISA”)22 prosecutions in
the case of a future internal armed conflict in Malaysia.23 Malaysia provides
a useful example of the study’s effects because it has been a hotbed of
violent extremism in recent years24 and because it has used controversial
means such as the ISA to address insurgent violence.25 This comment will
consider Malaysia’s practices in light of the involvement of the United States
in a future conflict, given the United States’ aggressive posture toward
combating terrorism and the U.S. military’s stated adherence to rules of
customary IHL.26 Due to the conflicts between the study’s customary law
20

See infra Part IV, Part A.2.
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The ICRC’s Status: In a Class By Its Own, February 17, 2004,
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/522C6628D83A019741256E3D003FC85F. See also
DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 510; INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 154 (2000) (explaining that the
international community considers the ICRC to be “a highly important organization” due to its role in
wartime situations, its “strict observance of confidentiality” in providing battlefield care, and its
contribution to the development of humanitarian law).
22
Internal Security Act, Act 82 (1960) (Malay.) [hereinafter ISA].
23
Since 2001, Malaysia has used the ISA to detain and prosecute persons allegedly involved in
“militant Islamic activities” of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization and the Kumpulan Militan
Malaysia insurgent organization. Malaysia has received widespread criticism for its law enforcement
practices under the ISA in combating these groups, including the abuse of detainees and the lack of
meaningful criminal procedure guarantees. See Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia’s
Internal Security Act, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1345, 1346-48 (2003); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED
WITHOUT TRIAL: ABUSE OF INTERNAL SECURITY DETAINEES IN MALAYSIA 7, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/malaysia0905/3.htm.
24
See United States Department of State, Consular Information Sheet, Malaysia, supra note 4.
25
See Fritz & Flaherty, supra note 23, at 1347.
26
See BRIAN J. BILL, ED., LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK 32 (2000) (explaining that the U.S.
considers most of APII to be customary international law). Additionally, the U.S. military considers
customary international law binding on U.S. forces operating worldwide. DoD Directive 5100.77, DoD
Law of War Program, December 9, 1998, available at www.hqda.army.mil/ogc/
EXEC%20AGENTS%20REF%20LIBRARY/19%20d510077p.pdf, § 3.1. See infra Part IV.2 (regarding
the questionable legality of U.S. conduct in “the War on Terror”).
21
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findings and Malaysian practices, the study could hinder the United States’
ability to fully support Malaysian counterinsurgency operations.
Although the study’s findings are controversial,27 this comment does
not address its methodology or conclusions, rather accepting the findings in
light of the ICRC’s well-respected international status. Part II of this
comment will discuss the regulation of internal armed conflict. Part III will
identify the conflicts between Malaysia’s counterinsurgency practices and its
customary IHL obligations in the context of a future internal armed conflict.
Part IV will discuss the ramifications of this inconsistency in the context of
coalition military operations in Malaysia and conclude by identifying the
broader international ramifications of the study.
II.

THE RED CROSS STUDY IMPACTS THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT

Unlike the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which regulate conflict
between states, IHL governing internal armed conflicts regulates a sovereign
state’s internal efforts to suppress insurgencies.28 Changes in the system of
rules of customary international law governing internal strife thus invade the
state’s internal sphere because customary law can apply regardless of the
applicability of Geneva Convention provisions.29 This Part will identify the
source of this interplay and discuss the ICRC customary law study’s general
effect on state domestic law.
A.

States Have Opposed the Regulation of Internal Armed Conflicts as an
Invasion of Sovereign Authority

International humanitarian law regulating internal armed conflict,
such as the Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
(“APII”),30 recognizes the sovereign authority of a state to put down
insurrection as an internal matter.31 Instead of prohibiting the prosecution of
27
See W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study: A Preliminary Assessment, Presentation
offered at 99th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., April 1,
2005 (criticizing the basis for the ICRC study’s findings of customary prohibitions of incendiary weapons,
exploding bullets and blinding laser weapons).
28
Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Geneva Conventions, Protocol II: The Confrontation of Sovereignty and
International Law, The Amer. Soc. Of Int’l L. Newsletter, Nov. 1995.
29
See infra Part II, Section B.
30
APII, supra note 7.
31
See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 1332 [hereinafter APII Commentary] (Combatant status for insurgents “would be incompatible, first,
with respect for the principle of sovereignty of States, and secondly, with national legislation which makes
rebellion a crime.”).
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insurgents, this body of law establishes minimum protections for insurgents
facing criminal prosecution.32 As a result, states have long opposed this
interference with affairs they perceive to be wholly of domestic concern.
Prior to the enactment of the Additional Protocols in 1977, Common
Article Three was the sole provision of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
addressing non-international, or internal armed conflict.33 In essence, it
provided a “mini-convention” applicable to internal armed conflict and
established minimum protections and prohibitions.34 Many countries have
continuously resisted the application of Common Article Three to internal
conflicts, arguing that extending IHL to internal conflicts lends unjustified
legitimacy to insurgent groups and interferes with sovereign authority.35
Especially in the face of such criticism, the ICRC recognized that Common
Article Three inadequately regulated internal armed conflict. This is largely
due to the Article’s ambiguity, incomplete protections, and general lack of
strong use and enforcement.36
The prevalence of internal conflicts in place of international ones
since 1945 made more apparent the need for an adequate body of law
governing such conflicts. In 1974 the ICRC convened a diplomatic
convention to develop additional, more detailed rules for internal and
international armed conflict.37 The resultant APII, however, did not receive
as widespread support as the Geneva Conventions of 1949.38 Like Common
Article Three, many developing states opposed the Additional Protocols
32
Id. at 1325. See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Relevance of IHL in the Context of
Terrorism,
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/
8C4F3170C0C25CDDC1257045002CD4A2 (“In non-international armed conflict combatant status does
not exist. Prisoner of war or civilian protected status under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions,
respectively, do not apply. Members of organized armed groups are entitled to no special status under the
laws of non-international armed conflict and may be prosecuted under domestic criminal law if they have
taken part in hostilities.”).
33
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 14.
34
See id.
35
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2002). See also Aslan Abashidze,
The Relevance from the Perspective of Actors in Non-International Armed Conflicts, Address Before the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council-Partnership for Peace Workshop on Customary International
Humanitarian
Law
(March
9-10,
2006),
available
at
http://pforum.isn.ethz.ch/events/
index.cfm?action=detail&eventID=258 (“The inclusion of the Art 3 in all the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 was the decisive move towards the legal intrusion of international humanitarian law into the
traditional sphere of internal affairs of sovereign states. . .”).
36
Schneider, supra note 28.
37
See MOIR, supra note 35, at 89.
38
One hundred and ninety-two countries are parties to the Conventions of 1949, but only 162 and
159 states are parties to Additional Protocols I and II, respectively. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
STATES PARTY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, (Apr. 12, 2005),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList492/
77EA1BDEE20B4CCDC1256B6600595596.
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because of a view that they “granted too much legal legitimacy to non-state
belligerents and to the use of guerilla warfare.”39
Additional Protocol II and rules of customary law derived from it such
as those of the ICRC study regulate internal armed conflict in much greater
detail than does Common Article Three. For example, Common Article
Three prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment.”40 In contrast, APII contains a full article titled
“humane treatment” which sets out specific prohibitions, such as “(e)
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
... (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.”41 Similarly, each of
APII’s 28 articles establishes specific and detailed guarantees and
prohibitions to which a state must adhere when fighting an internal armed
conflict within the Protocol’s scope. As a result, the evolution of customary
law derived from APII can have great effect on non-party states. As will be
shown below, these customary rules may apply whether or not an insurgent
group meets the threshold conditions to trigger the protections of APII.
B.

The Red Cross Study Sought to Identify the Effects of Customary Law
on the International Regulation of Armed Conflict

The interplay of domestic law and APII illuminate the invasive
ramifications of the ICRC study. The ICRC, because of its international
mandate to promulgate IHL, clarifies and increases the legal obligations of
states through interpretive tools such as the 2005 customary law study. By
arguing that a rule derived from conventions such as APII is customary law,
the ICRC challenges non-party states such as Malaysia to bring their
domestic laws into compliance in the face of alleged international consensus.
Several problems with APII led the ICRC to complete a study
identifying rules of customary international law that are binding on nonparty states and universally applicable regardless of whether APII would
apply to the conflict.42 The Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols may or may not apply to a given conflict based on the type and
magnitude of the conflict, and based on whether the combatant parties are
39
Nathan A. Canestaro, “Small Wars” and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the Insurgents in Iraq,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73, 90-91 (2004). See also DETTER, supra note 21, at 202-04.
40
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 14.
41
APII, supra note 7, art. 4.
42
See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at xxvii. See also MOIR, supra note 35, at 109
(writing in 2002 that, “It is doubtful whether much of APII represents even customary international law, let
alone jus cogens. . .”).
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signatories to the conventions.43 The ICRC study thus had two central
purposes. First, the study identified rules of customary international law
applicable to armed conflict, regardless of whether a particular state has
ratified a treaty or convention governing armed conflict.44 Second, the study
determined whether and to what extent customary law has come to exceed
the protections of APII and other sources of IHL.45
The study found that state practice worldwide has “expanded the rules
applicable to non-international armed conflicts” beyond the limits of APII,
and that state practice has caused several provisions of APII to become
customary international law.46 Examples of such expanded rules include the
principle of distinction, the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, a
proportionality provision, and obligations to protect and respect the
fundamental rights of civilians and enemies who have laid down their
arms.47
The expansion and elaboration of the IHL regime through customary
international law impacts states not parties to treaties and conventions such
as the Geneva Conventions. Arguing that a rule is customary international
law carries with it the implied assertion that the applicability of treaty law
such as APII to the given conflict is irrelevant. This effect is readily
43

For example, the Geneva Conventions apply only “to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more High Contracting Parties.” Geneva Conventions,
supra note 14, common art. 2. Similarly, APII has several restrictive limiting conditions that prevent it
from applying to mere uprisings and requires “the most intense and large scale [internal] conflicts.” MOIR,
supra note 35, at 101, discussing APII, supra note 7, art. 1. See also Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 177-78
(“The first purpose of the study was therefore to determine which rules of international humanitarian law
are part of customary international law and therefore applicable to all parties of a conflict, regardless of
whether or not they have ratified the treaties containing the same or similar rules.”).
44
Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 177.
45
Id. at 178.
46
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at xxix; Id. at 189.
47
Id. at 187-88. The following are several of the relevant customary law rules the study identifies:
“(1) Fundamental Guarantees: Rule 87. Civilians and persons hors de combat must be treated humanely.
Rule 90. Torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, are prohibited . . . Rule 99. Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited. Rule
100. No one may be convicted or sentenced, except pursuant to a fair trial affording all essential judicial
guarantees . . . Rule 102. No one may be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual criminal
responsibility. Rule 103. Collective punishments are prohibited . . . (2) Persons Deprived of Their Liberty:
Rule 118. Persons deprived of their liberty must be provided with adequate food, water, clothing, shelter
and medical attention . . . Rule 125. Persons deprived of their liberty must be allowed to correspond with
their families, subject to reasonable conditions relating to frequency and the need for censorship by the
authorities. Rule 126. Civilian internees and persons deprived of their liberty in connection with a noninternational armed conflict must be allowed to receive visitors, especially near relatives, to the degree
practicable. Rule 127. The personal convictions and religious practices of persons deprived of their liberty
must be respected . . . Rule 128(C). Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a non-international
armed conflict must be released as soon as the reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist.
The persons referred to may continue to be deprived of their liberty if penal proceedings are pending
against them or if they are serving a sentence lawfully imposed.” Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 206-09.
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explored through considering one state’s law enforcement practices in light
of the study’s findings.
The magnitude of an insurgency required to trigger the application of
the customary rules is unclear from the study. APII contains very strict
threshold criteria an insurgent force must meet in order to obtain its
protections;48 for example, an unorganized mob would not invoke APII. The
ICRC study has found that the rules of customary law have exceeded APII’s
regulation of IAC,49 but the study is silent on whether those rules still
require – as customary law – the meeting of APII’s threshold conditions.
Since the study does not explicitly incorporate these trigger
conditions, this comment assumes that these rules would protect any
insurgent qualifying for the protections of Common Article Three. The text
of Common Article Three is silent on its triggering conditions, but its
commentary provides a list of suggested criteria derived from the
amendments discussed during the 1949 drafting convention.50 Generalized
criteria that could qualify an organized insurgency in Malaysia in the future
require that, to invoke the protections of the Article:
“the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses
an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts,
acting within a determinate territory and having the means of
respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.”51
Such an assumption is reasonable when considering how the rules could
affect coalition operations in non-party states such as Malaysia. First,
Malaysia has experienced powerful insurgencies as recently as the several
years since 2001.52 Second, should a coalition partner consider the
insurgents protected due to that country’s interpretation of ICRC study, the
ICRC’s omission would be irrelevant. Consequently, this comment will
assume for the purposes of its analysis that a future insurgent group would
meet any conditions required to invoke the ICRC study’s customary rules.

48

Article I of APII requires the “dissident armed forces or other organized groups” to be “under
responsible command” and to “exercise such control over a part of [the state’s] territory as to enable [the
insurgents] to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.” APII, supra note 7, art. 1.
49
Henckaerts, supra note 5, at 189.
50
See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 49-50,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/365-570006?OpenDocument.
51
See id. at 49.
52
See infra Part IV.A.1.
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MALAYSIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY ACT LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES
VIOLATE THE STUDY’S RULES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

III.

Malaysia’s much-utilized Internal Security Act is a likely legal tool
with which Malaysia would detain and prosecute future insurgents and
terrorists.53 However, the language and application of the ISA are
inconsistent with the ICRC study’s rules of customary international law.
Other commentators have addressed the illegality of the ISA from the
perspective of human rights law.54 Given the numerous similarities between
human rights law and IHL,55 many of the same concerns arise when
evaluating the ISA against IHL obligations.
A.

Malaysia Continues to Use the Internal Security Act to Target Internal
Opposition

Malaysia enacted the ISA in 1960 as an emergency power, but it has
become an everyday law enforcement measure. Use of the ISA has steadily
increased since 2001 to target alleged militant Islamic groups,56 and both the
language of the ISA and Malaysia’s practices in enforcing it are sources of
controversy. First, the language of the ISA diminishes a person’s freedom
from arbitrary detention, revokes his or her criminal procedural protections,
and destroys the presumption of innocence and the right to a trial.57
Additionally, in practice, the Royal Malaysian Police has physically and
psychologically abused ISA detainees and maintained poor conditions of
detention.58
In 1960, following twelve years of British struggle against communist
insurgents during the “Malayan Emergency,” the newly independent
53

See Fritz, supra note 23, at 1346.
See id. at 1346-47.
55
See Borelli, supra note 13, at 66, citing Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Precautionary Measures in Guantánamo Bay, 12 May 2002, ILM, Vol. 41 (2002), 532 (“It is wellrecognized that international human rights law applies at all times, in peacetime and in situations of armed
conflict. [I]n situations of armed conflict, the protections under international human rights and
humanitarian law may complement and reinforce one another . . . sharing as they do a common nucleus of
non-derogable rights and a common purpose of promoting human life and dignity.”).
56
Fritz, supra note 23, at 1347.
57
See id. at 1349-50. This comment’s analysis of the ISA will not compare the ISA to ordinary
criminal procedure rights in Malaysia. Instead, this comment considers the ISA solely in light of
customary international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that the ISA abrogates
many otherwise available rights of an accused criminal, including the right to be informed of the grounds
for one’s arrest, the right to consult an attorney, and the presumption of innocence.
See
Lawyerment.com.my, Criminal Law – Arrest, http://www.lawyerment.com.my/library/doc/crmn/arrest/
(providing general information on criminal procedure in Malaysia) (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
58
Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based Policing, AI Index ASA 28/001/2005,
April 7, 2005, available at http://origin2.amnesty.org/library/eng-mys/index.
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Malaysian government incorporated many British emergency powers into
the ISA as a temporary tool to combat communist insurgents.59 Over time,
however, the ISA has become a government tool to “delegitimize
generations of political opposition and silence those considered ‘deviant’ or
‘subversive.’”60
The ISA has also become a law enforcement tool in the struggle
against trans-national Islamic extremists. Since 2001, the Malaysian
government has increasingly used the ISA to arrest and detain individuals for
alleged involvement in militant Islamic activities.61 Given this shift in the
targets of the ISA, Malaysia would likely continue to use it as a law
enforcement tool against future militant Islamic insurgents.
Human rights groups have long opposed the ISA,62 finding the lack of
police accountability, objectionable police methods, and politicallymotivated detentions associated with its enforcement to violate widelyaccepted international human rights norms.63 While previous criticism has
considered the ISA in light of human rights obligations, many of the same
concerns arise in a humanitarian law context. Because many of the same
fundamental rights inform IHL and human rights law,64 many violations of
human rights law also violate IHL rules.
These customary law violations, combined with the problematic
conditions of detention discussed above, demonstrate the central underlying
problem with the ISA:
its inherent vagueness as a discretionary,
65
“emergency” measure. The ICRC has identified “emergency powers” as a

59

Fritz, supra note 23, at 1376.
Id. at 1346, 1376. Malaysian courts have rejected arguments that the ISA narrowly applies only to
communist insurgencies; in a 2002 case, the Malaysian Federal Court held that “the purpose of the ISA is
for all forms of subversion...” Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals,
2002-4 M.L.J. 449 (Malay.).
61
Fritz, supra note 23, at 1346; see also Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based
Policing, supra note 58 (“Since 2001 hundreds of alleged Islamist ‘extremists’ have been arrested, accused
of links to domestic or regional ‘terrorist’ networks. Over 80 of those arrested have been issued two year
detention orders and these orders are routinely extended without explanation”).
62
Fritz, supra note 23, at 1346.
63
The Fritz study, utilizing interviews and research, found five areas of concern regarding the ISA’s
modern use: “(1) the emergency framework of preventive detention laws; (2) reasonable suspicion or
probable cause triggering arrest and detention; (3) legal defense and access to counsel; (4) forms of review;
and (5) conditions of detention.” Id. at 1349.
64
See Borelli, supra note 13, at 66.
65
Since the ISA’s roots and purpose lie in emergency situations, political pressure since 1960 has
favored strengthening the ISA, not moderating it to bring it in line with international concerns. Amnesty
International notes that “successive states of emergency [have] led to the imposition of incrementally
tighter restrictions on fundamental rights and liberties. . . . ” Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human
Rights-Based Policing, supra note 58.
60
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source of many of the world’s IHL abuses, and Malaysia’s ISA provides
further examples of the possible IHL violations such powers can cause.66
B.

The Application of the Internal Security Act Is Inconsistent with
Customary International Humanitarian Law

The language of the ISA and Malaysia’s enforcement practices are
inconsistent with Malaysia’s customary law obligations as identified by the
ICRC study. Specific violations of Malaysia’s customary law obligations
include arbitrary and lengthy detention without trial, charge, or hearing; the
abuse of detainees and poor conditions of detention; and the denial of
minimal criminal procedural guarantees.67 The ICRC customary law
findings prohibit some textual provisions of the ISA and many of Malaysia’s
ISA enforcement procedures and practices.
1.

Malaysia’s Treatment of Internal Security Act Detainees Violates Its
Customary International Humanitarian Law Obligations

Malaysian treatment of ISA detainees indicates violations of
customary law that correlate to protections contained in Article 4 of APII.68
Although the ICRC study vaguely defines its rules, several aspects of the
conditions of ISA detentions violate the study’s customary law obligations.
a.

Internal Security Act detainees receive inhumane treatment

Rule 87 of the study requires the humane treatment of civilians and
insurgent combatants who have laid down their arms.69 This rule is almost
identical to Article 4 of APII, which states that detainees “shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely.”70 The study does not precisely define

66
Editorial, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, March 2005, at 5, 5-7 (“For the ‘survival of the State’ or
the ‘imperatives of security,’ almost any measure is authorized to back up the goal of protecting society:
the call for strong and decisive action sets the social context for torture. What begins as a programme
centred on a limited number of suspects usually expands over time to encompass an ill-defined group or
category of people.”).
67
See Fritz, supra note 23, at 1349-50. Additionally, the Fritz study found that 1) detention
conditions did not meet HRL obligations, 2) detainees were subject to physical and psychological abuse
during interrogation, and 3) detainees were denied contact with their families during the initial sixty-day
detention. The study concluded that “the dire conditions of detention, the psychological abuse inflicted
during interrogation, and the denial of access to detainees’ families remain standard procedure, and ensure
that the experience of detention under the ISA is almost intolerable.” Id. at 1417.
68
APII, supra note 7, art. 4.
69
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 306.
70
APII, supra note 7, art. 4.
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“humane treatment,”71 instead relying on “the detailed rules found in
international humanitarian law and human rights law [that] give expression
to the meaning of ‘humane treatment.’”72 The study notes the prevalence in
many international legal instruments of guarantees for a person’s “dignity”
and prohibitions on “ill treatment.”73 Similarly, the APII Commentary states
that humane treatment “should be understood in its broadest sense as
applying to all the conditions of man’s existence.”74
Similarly, Rule 118 states that “persons deprived of their liberty must
be provided with adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical
attention.”75 This provision does not mirror specific language of Article 4 of
APII, but instead further elaborates on the term “humane treatment.” The
study interprets this rule to require that a state provide detainees with basic
needs of subsistence that meet the conditions for subsistence of the local
population, such that not providing adequate basic provisions “amounts to
inhuman treatment.”76
Several aspects of the conditions of the ISA detainees’ imprisonment
violate these customary law requirements. These conditions include lengthy
solitary confinement in brightly-lit cells; filthy cells lacking beds; and the
denial of reading material, adequate nutrition, and clothing.77 Additionally,
as will be discussed below, studies have identified instances of physical and
psychological abuse of detainees that may amount to torture.

71

“The term ‘treat humanely’ is based on the [1907] Hague Regulations [Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land]. . . . The word ‘treatment’ should be understood in its broadest sense as applying
to all the conditions of man’s existence.” APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1370.
72
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 307-08 (The study looks at numerous sources to
inform this Rule, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.).
73
Id. at 307.
74
See APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1370.
75
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 428.
76
Id. at 430, citing APII, art. 5(1)(b). The general requirement of humane treatment may also
demand compliance with Rule 127 as well as Rules 87 and 118. Rule 127 states that “[t]he personal
convictions and religious practices of persons deprived of their liberty must be respected.” This provision
requires a state to permit detainees to practice their religion subject to the disciplinary requirements of
detention. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 449. This requirement is analogous to
Article 4, paragraph 1 of APII, which states that detainees “are entitled to respect for their person, honour,
and convictions and religious practices.” As the Commentary to Article 4 states, this requirement “is an
element of humane treatment.” APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1370.
77
See Fritz, supra note 23, at 1421; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL: ABUSE OF
INTERNAL SECURITY DETAINEES IN MALAYSIA, supra note 23, at 21.
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b.

Malaysia’s inhuman treatment of Internal Security Act detainees
violates customary international law and may constitute torture

At a minimum, Malaysia treats ISA detainees inhumanely, and its
actions may constitute torture when there is a coercive motive behind police
actions. Rule 90 prohibits “torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”78
This provision mirrors Article 4, paragraph 2(a) of APII, which prohibits
“violence to the life, health, and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any
form of corporal punishment.”79 Aside from APII, several international
conventions absolutely prohibit torture and underscore the illegality of
Malaysia’s ISA practices. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,80 the
United Nations Convention Against Torture,81 the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights,82 and the Geneva Conventions83 all prohibit
torture, although they may rely on different definitions of torture.84
The study defines torture as “the infliction of ‘severe physical or
mental pain or suffering’ for purposes such as ‘obtaining information or a
confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.’”85 “Inhuman treatment” is similarly defined,
absent the requirement of a purpose in its infliction.86 Unfortunately, these
definitions fail to specify with great detail what qualifies as “severe physical
or mental pain or suffering.” Nonetheless, several studies have found
detainee abuse patterns in Malaysia inconsistent with this generalized
prohibition.

78

HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 315.
APII, supra note 7, art. 4.
80
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 5,U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
81
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984),(entered into force June 26, 1987).
82
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 7, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”).
83
See Geneva Convention [I], supra note 14, art. 3, 12; Geneva Convention [III], supra note 14, art.
13.
84
Amnesty International considers the absolute protection from torture to be “one of the
fundamental rights from which no derogation is permitted, even in times of emergency or war,” especially
given the fact that many conventions and treaties specifically prohibit torture “in times of emergency or
war.” Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based Policing, supra note 58.
85
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 317, citing Elements of Crimes for the ICC,
Definition of Torture as a war crime (ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(ii) and (c)(i)). The commentary to APII
similarly defines torture. APII, supra note 7, art. 4(a); APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1373.
86
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 318.
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Though physical abuse of detainees appears to have abated since its
widespread use during the 1960s and 1970s, the Royal Malaysian Police
continue to threaten physical violence, beat prisoners during interrogation,
and inflict extreme psychological abuse.87 Human Rights Watch found
allegations of “physical and psychological torture, including allegations of
physical assault, forced nudity, sleep deprivation, around-the-clock
interrogation, death threats, threats of bodily harm to family members,
including threats of rape and bodily harm to their children.”88 Additionally,
Human Rights Watch has chronicled ISA detention camp police practices
that were replete with excessive violence and deliberate acts of
humiliation.89
Similar to the study’s definition of torture, the study’s circular
definition of “outrages upon personal dignity” fails to adequately specify
prohibited conduct. The ICRC study defines such outrages “as acts which
humiliate, degrade, or otherwise violate the dignity of a person to such a
degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity.”90
Amnesty International (“AI”) found similar allegations of physical and
psychological abuse that constitutes outrages upon personal dignity.91
Despite the ICRC’s unclear definition of outrages upon personal dignity,
Malaysian police actions included intentional humiliation.
AI chronicles one individual, Abdul Malek Hussein, who claims “his
mouth was forced open and he was forced to drink urine… his genitals were
hit with a hard object, and . . . cold water was poured over him while naked
in an air conditioned room.”92 Amnesty International also chronicles other
ISA detainees’ allegations of physical abuse, sexual humiliation, and
psychological harassment.93 In addition to the abuse of Mr. Hussein, AI
found that Malaysia subjected ISA detainees to physical assault, solitary
confinement, “prolonged aggressive interrogation,” and other actual and
threatened physical and psychological abuse.94 These accounts constitute
87

Fritz, supra note 23, at 1423-24.
Human Rights Watch, Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political Dissent,
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/malaysia-bck-0513.htm; see also Human Rights Watch, Malaysia:
ISA Detainees Beaten and Humiliated, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/09/28/malays11788.htm (One
detainee stated, “I was continuously beaten and forced to strip naked, ordered to crawl while entering the
room. . . ”).
89
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL: ABUSE OF INTERNAL SECURITY DETAINEES
IN M ALAYSIA, supra note 23, at 13-19.
90
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 319.
91
See Amnesty Int’l, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based Policing, supra note 58.
92
Id.
93
Id.
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Id.
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humiliating outrages upon the dignity of the victims and violate Malaysia’s
customary obligations.
The illegal treatment of detainees is only one area in which Malaysian
actions have violated customary IHL. As discussed in the following section,
the ISA and Malaysia’s enforcement practices also fail to safeguard
detainees’ fundamental rights of criminal procedure.
2.

Malaysia’s Failure to Provide Adequate Judicial Guarantees for
Internal Security Act Defendants Violates Its Customary Law
Obligations

Several aspects of the ISA also implicate the judicial guarantees of
Article 6 of APII and many of the specific rules found to be customary IHL
in the ICRC study. Specifically, evidence indicates that ISA practices violate
Rules 99, 100, 102, 103, and 128, all of which correlate to guarantees found
in Article 6 of APII.95
a.

Internal Security Act detentions are arbitrary and lack judicial review

Rule 99 prohibits the “arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”96 The ICRC
study states that security concerns must be the basis for detention, and calls
for continued detention upon a showing that such concerns are legitimate.97
This rule elaborates on Article 6 of APII, which requires states to respect
judicial guarantees of persons during “preliminary investigation and trial”.98
The ICRC’s basis for this finding of customary practice rests on State
legislation prohibiting practices ranging “from unlawful/illegal confinement
and unlawful/illegal detention to arbitrary or unnecessary detention.”99 The
study relies largely on customary human rights law, which “establishes (i) an
obligation to inform a person who is arrested of the reasons for arrest, (ii) an
obligation to bring a person arrested on a criminal charge promptly before a
judge, and (iii) an obligation to provide a person deprived of liberty with an
opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of detention.”100
Similarly, Rule 102 prohibits conviction “except on the basis of
individual criminal responsibility,”101 and Rule 103 implements this by

95
96
97
98
99
100
101

APII, supra note 7, art. 6.
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 344.
Id. at 348.
APII Commentary, supra note 31, at 1396.
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 347.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 372.
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prohibiting collective punishments.102 These provisions require that the
accused only face punishment for acts in which he or she personally took
part.103
The ISA’s text contradicts these rules of customary international law
by granting the police largely unchecked discretion in detaining persons.
For example, Section 73 of the ISA permits the police to detain a person for
60 days without a warrant, trial, or access to legal counsel on suspicion that
“he has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to
the security of Malaysia.”104 Section 73 only requires police to have reason
to believe a person has violated the ill-defined ISA,105 and Malaysian law
enforcement practices include summary detentions for no reason other than
the detainee’s political opposition.106
Since the ISA permits preemptive, preventative detentions on
suspicion that a person may be about to act in an undefined, prohibited
manner, it essentially provides for arbitrary arrest by which “a detainee is,
therefore, presumed guilty without trial.”107 One cabinet minister told
Human Rights Watch that ISA detainees “have not committed any crime
because ISA is preventive. You cannot, therefore, go to court. The
government has information that something will happen. We can’t wait till it
happens. . . . So before it happens we detain them.”108
Malaysia’s 2001 persecution of the National Justice Party, an
opposition political party, contradicts these rules. In April 2001, the police
arrested ten individuals associated with the National Justice Party, which is
better known as Keadilan. While the government alleged that those arrested
sought to obtain bomb-making materials, their interrogations were devoid of
any mention of violence and instead focused on their political activity,
sources of funding, and even their extra-marital affairs.109 Especially since
there may have been no probable cause to arrest these persons,110 the
political nature of their interrogations indicates that the detentions were
arbitrary.

102

Id. at 374.
Id. at 373.
104
Internal Security Act, Act 82, sec. 73(1), (1960) (Malay.), discussed in Human Rights Watch,
Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political Dissent, supra note 88.
105
Internal Security Act, Act 82, sec. 73, (1960) (Malay.).
106
Fritz, supra note 23, at 1379.
107
Human Rights Watch, Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political Dissent,
supra note 88.
108
Human Rights Watch, Malaysia: ISA Detainees Beaten and Humiliated, supra note 88.
109
Fritz, supra note 23, at 1386.
110
Id. at 1386.
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Additionally, the ISA does not allow for judicial review of initial
detentions. It originally did permit such review, but amendments have
removed that avenue such that “absolute power is given to the Minister of
Home Affairs to arbitrarily detain anyone, without reference to the
courts.”111 Two-year detentions have been indefinitely renewed without ever
charging the detainee or bringing him to trial.112 The ISA’s grant of arbitrary
and indefinite power to the government violates Malaysia’s customary IHL
obligations and obliterates the targeted defendant’s rights from the outset of
his or her detention.
b.

Malaysia has not provided fair trials to Internal Security Act
detainees

The ICRC study’s findings of criminal procedural guarantees also
exceed APII’s protections, adding more detailed customary rules to the IHL
regime. Rule 100 states that “[n]o one may be convicted or sentenced,
except pursuant to a fair trial affording all essential judicial guarantees.”113
Drawing on the language of both the Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols, this provision requires “that courts be independent,114
impartial115 and regularly constituted;”116 questions the legality of
suspending these requirements during states of emergency;117 and mandates
the maintenance of the presumption of innocence.118 Similarly, Rule 128(C)
requires that detainees in an internal armed conflict “be released as soon as
the reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist,” but permits
111

Human Rights Watch, Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political Dissent,
supra note 88. See also Internal Security Act, Act 82, sec. 8(B) (“(1) There shall be no judicial review in
any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision
made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power in
accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in
this Act governing such act or decision.”)
112
Amnesty International, Malaysia: Towards Human Rights-Based Policing, supra note 58.
113
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 5, at 352.
114
An independent tribunal “must be able to perform its functions independently of any other branch
of the government, especially the executive.” Id. at 355-57 (citation omitted).
115
An impartial tribunal consists of judges who neither “harbour preconceptions about the matter
before them, nor act in a way that promotes the interests of one side,” and must have adequate “guarantees
to exclude any legitimate doubt about its impartiality.” Id. at 356.
116
“A court is regularly constituted if it has been established and organised in accordance with the
laws and procedures already in force in a country.” Id. at 355.
117
Id. at 355.
118
“The presumption of innocence means that any person subject to penal proceedings must be
presumed to be not guilty... until proven otherwise. This means that the burden of proof lies on the
prosecution, while the defendant has the benefit of the doubt. It also means that guilt must be proven
according to a determined standard” (e.g. “beyond a reasonable doubt” (in common law countries)). Id. at
357 (footnotes omitted).
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continued detention “if penal proceedings are pending against them or if
they are serving a sentence lawfully imposed.”119
Rule 100 also includes several procedural guarantees owed to an
insurgent defendant. The accused must be provided with “information on
the nature and cause of the accusation” against him or her, receive
“necessary rights and means of defense,” receive “trial without undue
delay,” be able to examine witnesses against him or her, have the assistance
of an interpreter if necessary, have the right to be present at trial, not be
compelled to testify against him or herself or to confess guilt, not be
subjected to public proceedings, and “not be punished more than once for
the same act or on the same charge.”120 The ICRC bases these requirements
on international law, military manuals, and state domestic law.121
ISA-based detentions violate these rules because they lack effective
means of judicial review of these detentions. For example, the ISA permits
the government to not “disclose facts or to produce documents which [it]
considers to be against the national interest to disclose or produce.”122 This
provision enables the government to withhold “the very facts that
purportedly support the necessity of the individual’s arrest and detention,”
and thus significantly limits the courts’ ability to review ISA detentions.123
Following the initial sixty-day detention, the Minister of Home Affairs
can indefinitely order two-year extensions to detention.124 These orders are
not subject to judicial scrutiny and require no vetting or justification.125 The
government has used this extension option,126 and it enables the government

119

Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 358-370.
Id. at 354-370 (The study often cites the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
statements of international tribunals, the Geneva Conventions, and other texts.).
122
See Internal Security Act, Act 82, sec. 16 (1960) (Malay.) (“Nothing in this Chapter or in any rules
made thereunder shall require the Minister or any member of an Advisory Board or any public servant to
disclose facts or to produce documents which he considers it to be against the national interest to disclose
or produce.”).
123
Fritz, supra note 23, at 1407. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED WITHOUT TRIAL:
ABUSE OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT DETAINEES IN MALAYSIA, supra note 23, at 24-26 (noting the
unwillingness of the Malaysian Federal Court to intervene in the face of well-supported habeas corpus
petitions).
124
See Internal Security Act, Act 82, sec. 8(1) (1960) (Malay.) (“If the Minister is satisfied that the
detention of any person is necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the
economic life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as a detention order) directing that that
person be detained for any period not exceeding two years.”).
125
Human Rights Watch, Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political Dissent,
supra note 88.
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Detention of nine under ISA extended, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), Sept. 24, 2003.
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to prolong detentions without judicial review and without having to provide
a trial for the detainee.
In fact, courts have also shown an unwillingness to intervene even in
acknowledged unlawful detentions.
The Malaysian Federal Court,
responding to the appeal of the Keadilan ISA detainees, found that their
detentions were in fact unlawful, but declined to review detentions
undertaken by authority of Section 8 of the ISA.127
IV.

THE ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY IMPACTS MULTINATIONAL
COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS

By identifying several rules contained within Additional Protocols I
and II that are customary international law, the ICRC has issued a challenge
to the world to address the deficient practices of non-party states. While this
comment identifies the domestic practices of one state in conflict with
customary international law, the study has broader ramifications for all states
seeking security assistance during conflicts, both internal and international.
These states will face the criticism of potential military coalition partners
who heed the study’s findings and demand compliance as a condition of
participation. This conflict has two effects: while it could obstruct the
efforts of troubled states to obtain unqualified security assistance, it also
could lead to legal reform in noncompliant states as they change their ways
in order to form partnerships with foreign militaries.
A.

The Conflict Between Malaysia’s Obligations and Practices Illustrates
the Ramifications of the Red Cross Study on Multinational Operations
in Failing States

The incongruence of state laws and the study’s customary IHL
obligations may impact multinational coalition military operations in states
fighting insurgencies, especially insurgencies of a transnational, terrorismbased nature. First, states not parties to APII face the articulated position of
the well-respected ICRC and emerging international consensus in choosing
whether to conform their counter-insurgency behavior and laws to its
customary law findings.128 Second, while non-party states may or may not
127
Fritz, supra note 23, at 1411 (discussing Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Nor & Others v. Ketua Polis
Negara, Judgment of Steve L.K. Shim, CJSS, 2002-4 M.L.J. 449 (Malay.)).
128
See Charles Garraway, The Relevance of Customary International Humanitarian Law from the
Perspective of the Armed Forces, Address Before the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council-Partnership for
Peace Workshop on Customary International Humanitarian Law (March 9, 2006), available at
http://pforum.isn.ethz.ch/events/index.cfm?action=detail&eventID=258 (“Even where one disagrees with
[the ICRC customary law study] . . . it will carry authority and is already being cited around the world.
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choose to reform their laws and practices, foreign forces adhering to the
ICRC’s findings will likely limit their cooperation in joint military
operations with these non-party states in order to meet their perceived
international law obligations.129 In light of the illegality of Malaysia’s ISA
practices with respect to the ICRC’s customary international law findings,
and the possibility that the United States would offer its assistance to combat
a terrorism-focused insurgency in Malaysia,130 it is useful to consider the
effects of the study, and Malaysia’s behavior, on U.S. forces operating in
Malaysia in the future.
1.

There Remains a Present Threat of Terrorism-Focused Insurgencies in
Southeast Asia

Analyzing the ICRC study’s ramifications in the context of a
Southeast Asian conflict is relevant at this time because of the likelihood of
future and increasing terrorist threats originating in the region. As one of the
world’s most heavily Muslim regions,131 and given the abundance of militant
Islamic activities in the region since 2001,132 it is likely that future
insurgencies will arise and will call for the application and enforcement of
IHL.
The Jemaah Islamiyah (“JI”) terrorist organization, like Al Qaeda and
the Abu Sayyaf Group, presents a new type of militant Islamic threat with
supra-national ideology and goals.133 While the regional governments have
made significant progress in combating and weakening JI,134 the same
confluence of factors that led to its ascension continue to exist.
Some scholars consider the international diffusion of trained radicals
following the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s to be very

Certainly, judges at international courts are likely to take its reasoning into account in formulating their
own views.”).
129
See infra Part IV.2.
130
For example, at various times since 2001, the United States has had military personnel in
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, and has been assisting in counter-terrorism operations in the
Philippines. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
BY REGIONAL
AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309A), September 30, 2003, available at
http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/M05/hst0309.pdf. See also ROBERT D. KAPLAN, IMPERIAL GRUNTS: THE
AMERICAN MILITARY ON THE GROUND 146-47 (2005).
131
Indonesia, for example, is the most populous Muslim nation, with 87% of its population, or 195
million persons, observing Islam; Similarly, Malaysia is 60.4% Muslim. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
COUNTRIES AND OTHER AREAS, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm. See also KAPLAN,
supra note 130, at 133 (2005).
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See Singh, supra note 1, at xiv-xvii.
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Id. at 1.
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instructive in predicting future militant Islamic activities today.135 Notorious
examples of veterans of that war include Osama Bin Laden; several of the
participants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; JI’s mastermind,
Hambali; and Ali Gufron, a planner of the 2002 Bali bombing.136 These
examples may be predictive of future militant Islamic activity worldwide,
especially in populous Muslim regions such as Southeast Asia.
2.

The Study Has Implications Both for a Malaysian Conflict and for
Multinational Operations Worldwide

In the context of a Malaysian internal armed conflict, possible
coalition partners might limit or qualify their participation in military
operations in Malaysia due to its objectionable ISA practices. The United
States, a likely partner given its global focus on combating terrorism,
provides an example in evaluating the potential impact of the ICRC study.
U.S. domestic and international law obligations could lead to limited support
for coalition operations in Malaysia.
It is possible Malaysia could seek international assistance in fighting
transnational terrorists within its borders in the future. Since 2001,
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) member states have
increasingly cooperated in efforts to combat terrorism.137 This multinational
focus is the result of international recognition that a transnational terrorist
organization introduces a need for international counterterrorism prevention
and operations.138 In the future, the region’s response to Islamic terror is
very likely to continue to be multinational given the 2001 and 2002 ASEAN
anti-terror pacts calling for mutual assistance, intelligence-sharing, and
cooperation, and given recent multinational operations against those
responsible for the Bali bombings.139
U.S. military policies indicate that the ICRC study will impact the
U.S. military’s conduct in an internal conduct. While conducting operations
in a foreign “host nation,” the host nation’s laws limit the actions of U.S.
military personnel. Specifically, U.S. military policies require forces to
135
Following the Soviet-Afghani war, hundreds of fighters from the U.S.-backed Mujahideen
returned to their home states and formed threatening terrorism organizations. Peter Bergen & Alec
Reynolds, Blowback Revisited, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 2-3.
136
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observe the host nation’s law unless it violates international law.140 Where
the host nation’s law does not meet the U.S. forces’ obligations under U.S.
domestic law or international law recognized by the U.S., the U.S. military
will limit its conduct to that which the U.S. considers legal.141 These
policies “encompass[] all international law for the conduct of hostilities
binding on the United States . . . including treaties and international
agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary
international law.”142
While members of the Administration of U.S. President George W.
Bush have argued that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to conflicts
with terrorist forces, the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the applicability
of IHL, including the Geneva Conventions, to these conflicts. In 2002, U.S.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez wrote that the “war against terrorism . . .
renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy
prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions.”143 In 2006, the U.S.
Supreme Court repudiated this argument, holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
that the military commission established to try Hamdan, Osama Bin Laden’s
alleged driver, was illegal in part because it ran afoul of Common Article
Three’s requirements for basic judicial guarantees.144 The U.S. Congress, in
establishing rules for Courts Martial, conditioned the authority to establish
military commissions to try combatants on “compliance with the law of
war,” e.g. the Geneva Conventions.145 Granted, Justice John Paul Stevens’s
opinion does not carry a majority when he states that customary international
law informs the minimum guarantees required under Common Article
Three.146 However, the Hamdan decision affirms the authority of IHL as a

140
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source of law and requires U.S. conduct to be in compliance with IHL so
long as the U.S. Congress invokes IHL in regulating military conduct.147
Given the ICRC’s position that several APII provisions are customary
international law, the study’s findings provide additional detail to the
undefined terminology of APII against which military lawyers will compare
proposed military operations. The United States military, as a matter of
policy, already considers almost all of APII to be customary international
law.148 The United States Army also already considers the detainee
protections of APII to be a “minimum standard” for all internal conflicts,149
with which it will comply whenever feasible given military operational
requirements.150 It is the ICRC’s elaboration on the rules of APII, and the
findings of customary rules exceeding APII’s protections, that will enhance
the regulation of internal armed conflict, and consequently the U.S.
military’s conduct.
Barring a change in U.S. policy, military judge advocates may advise
commanders to act within the limits of the ICRC study, which could impact
coalition operations intended to facilitate ISA detentions. The U.S.
Department of Defense places judge advocate legal advisors at every level of
the military command structure to advise military commanders on how to
comply with IHL obligations before, during, and after military operations.151
Additionally, judge advocates must review all operations, plans, rules of
engagement, and orders for compliance with IHL.152 The events of Abu
Ghraib, the controversy surrounding Guantanamo Bay, and other
controversial U.S. military detentions raised questions about the legality of
U.S. forces’ conduct under international law. At the time, senior military and
147
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civilian attorneys in the U.S. military perceived and raised these
questions.153 The ICRC study may provide strength for civilian counsels and
military judge advocate attorneys to argue that international law prohibits
the full participation of U.S. forces in a given counterinsurgency
operation.154 Limitations could include a prohibition on participation in
ISA-related operations, or even advising against participating in any
operations in Malaysia absent reform in the country’s practices.
The conflicts between Malaysia’s obligations under the ICRC’s
customary law study and its ISA detention practices could make it difficult
for Malaysia to obtain unqualified support from other states’ armies. The
limitations on United States military operations could be shared by all
coalition forces objecting to the ISA and Malaysian law enforcement
practices. Should Malaysia seek to obtain coalition support for a future
conflict, many of the same objections human rights organizations raise to the
ISA detentions would arise in the context of an internal armed conflict
subject to APII.
This problem is universally applicable to other conflicts in other states
not party to APII. Many of these states may find themselves seeking
international military assistance to combat future internal threats. Since
states seeking international assistance are often failed or failing states,155
many of them not parties to APII, the ICRC may have made it more difficult
for these countries to garner international support when needed.
B.

The Red Cross Study Has Broader Ramifications for the Advancement
of International Humanitarian Law

While the ICRC study may have directly limited some states’ access
to unqualified military support, it may also indirectly increase international
pressure for legal reform in these states. As discussed, the study has raised
the bar for all states to meet IHL obligations. As preeminent states such as
153
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the U.S. embrace the study, the ICRC will find available in multinational
military cooperation a new avenue to realize legal reform in non-party states.
The study’s findings introduce an avenue by which states observing
customary law may bring pressure to bear on noncompliant states. When a
foreign military prepares for or conducts operations with a non-party state,
the ICRC study will provide additional justification upon which a foreign
commander can refuse to cooperate in an illegal action. Additionally, that
commander will have legal justification to seek to bring the non-party state’s
conduct into line with customary international law.
The study thus counterbalances its burdensome effect on non-party
states by opening up a new avenue for international pressure to change the
behavior of noncompliant states: military cooperation.156 For example, the
United States conducts multinational military training programs to further
national security goals while subtly working to bring about change in foreign
military or law enforcement practices. Notable examples of this avenue for
reform include the Philippines and Colombia, where the United States
military has for many years offered training assistance to national forces.157
This training is replete with military skills instruction, but it also includes
significant amounts of human rights and IHL instruction at all levels of
command, from the foot soldier to the general.158 It is through military
security assistance such as coalition operations and these long-term training
missions that the international community can emphasize the importance of
adhering to customary rules of international law. The examples of Colombia
and the Philippines are ripe for repetition in several potentially violent states
not parties to APII, such as Malaysia.
The complexities of applying APII as customary law to a non-party
state’s internal conflict not only make the ICRC’s case for acceptance of
APII a more difficult argument, but they also provide an opportunity for the
international community to join the ICRC in calling for widespread
acceptance of increased regulation of internal armed conflicts. This
worldwide acceptance of an enhanced customary IHL regime could lead to
reforms in non-party states and considerably strengthen the humanitarian
protections afforded both civilians and combatants in internal armed
conflicts.
156
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CONCLUSION

Since the ICRC study may have a significant impact on states not
party to Additional Protocol II, the ICRC has issued a challenge to the world
to more strictly regulate internal armed conflict. While the study may have
made it more difficult for a troubled state to obtain full-fledged coalition
support from other countries, it also may have strengthened the ICRC’s hand
in realizing universal acceptance of the international regulation of internal
armed conflicts because of its effects on individual states who currently
object to the regulation of their internal conflicts.
While Malaysia provides a sound test case to consider the study’s
ramifications, the conflicts between the ICRC study’s findings and the ISA
practices are instructive of the possible effects of the study worldwide.
Other countries with similar, questionably-legal practices may find
themselves answering to a chorus of both military and political objections
should they seek assistance in their future conflicts.
Finally, an underlying purpose of the ICRC in promulgating rules of
customary IHL may be to preempt the further erosion of the IHL regime in
the face of the post-September 11th world response to terrorism. It is the
new global terrorism battlefield, in which states appeal to national security
and emergency situations as bases to abrogate people’s rights, that both
makes IHL vulnerable and makes customary law important.159 While states
such as the United States have shown willingness to issue and apply
controversial interpretations of applicable IHL in the face of terrorism,160
customary law continues to inform baseline requirements for situations to
which conventions and treaties may not apply. By issuing its customary law
study and encouraging dialogue within each state as well as internationally,
the ICRC has preemptively strengthened the IHL regime in the face of some
states’ willingness to exhibit flexibility and push the boundaries of what is
legal in such unclear situations.
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